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“Next to the right of liberty, the right of property is the most
important individual right guaranteed by the Constitution and the
one which, united with that of personal liberty, has contributed
more to the growth of civilization than any other institution
established by the human race.”
William Taft1
“If we don’t believe in freedom of expression for people we
despise, we don’t believe in it at all.”
Noam Chomsky2
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemplating the speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment,
the United States Supreme Court developed the public forum analysis to
assure that the public would always have a place to express themselves.
Originally, the doctrine applied strictly to government property. Eventually,
members of the public began to petition the courts for a guarantee of
speech rights on private property that shared the same characteristics as
government-owned public forums.
The Tenth Circuit recently handled a similar petition in First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp.3 Under the current public forum doctrine,
the Tenth Circuit correctly held that Salt Lake City’s easement across
Main Street Plaza was a traditional public forum.4 However, the
doctrine, as it currently exists, does not adequately balance private
owners’ equally important property rights. Consequently, this Casenote
addresses the inadequacies of the doctrine and sets forth an alternative
factor analysis for courts to implement when faced with a situation similar
to the one in this case. Under this modified approach, the Tenth Circuit
whould have ruled that the easement was a nonpublic forum.
This Casenote sets out the reasoning of both the district and appellate
court holdings in this case. Part II explains the facts leading up to the
lawsuit. Part III explains how the district court found that the easement was
a nonpublic forum and that the easement’s restrictions on speech
were valid. Part IV summarizes the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’
reversal of the district court’s ruling. Part V compares the Tenth Circuit’s
1.
(1989).
2.
3.
4.
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decision to the case law applicable to the public forum doctrine. Part
VI discusses how the Tenth Circuit’s ruling has affected the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, and the local
community. The conclusion in Part VII lays out an alternate method
for evaluating the public forum status of private property.
II. THE CONTROVERSY
This collision of free speech and property rights revolves around the
sale of a portion of Main Street in downtown Salt Lake City, Utah, to the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church or Church).
Main Street runs north and south through Salt Lake City. The sale
included the length of the street of one city block, approximately 660
feet in length,5 between North Temple and South Temple. The LDS
Church already owned both city blocks on the east and west of this
portion of Main Street.6
In 1995, the Salt Lake City Corporation (City) sold the subsurface
rights for the ground underneath the above-described portion of Main
Street to the LDS Church. The sale also included a right of first refusal
for the LDS Church if the City later decided to sell the surface rights.7
Then, in 1999, the City sold the LDS Church the surface rights to the
property.8 The sale was conditional upon the LDS Church’s agreement
to certain restrictions. As part of the special warranty deed, the City
reserved a pedestrian passage easement, utility easements, access for
emergency and police vehicles, and a view corridor that restricted the
erection of buildings on the plaza. The deed also contained a reverter if
the LDS Church failed to use the property as specified.9
Specifically, the dispute in this case arose from the easement that
allowed for pedestrian access and passage across the property. The
easement also specifically enumerated certain restricted activities,
disallowing the creation or constitution of a public forum on the property.10
5. Heather May, LDS Plaza Deal Done, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 29, 2003, at A1.
6. 308 F.3d at 1117. A sale of public property, like a street, to a private party has
precedent in Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City has sold “120 streets, alleys or sections of
thoroughfares since 1970.” Heather May, ACLU May Sue if SLC Gives up Plaza
Easement, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 24, 2002, at D1. However, until this sale, Salt Lake
City had never sold a “centerpiece” of downtown before. Id.
7. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1117.
8. Id. at 1118.
9. Id. at 1119.
10. The following is the actual wording of the restrictions on the easement:
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In essence, as a condition of the sale, the LDS Church had to allow
pedestrian access through the property, but it did not have to allow the
pedestrians to do or say whatever they pleased. This right to restrict
speech activities enraged many members of the community.11
After the sale of the property, the LDS Church closed down the street,
built an underground parking structure, and constructed a plaza where
the street had previously run. The plaza consists of paved walking areas,
planters, benches, waterfalls, and a large reflecting pool in the center.12
The plaintiffs, First Unitarian Church, Utahns for Fairness, Utah
National Organization for Women, and Craig S. Axford, challenged the
sale of the property and the LDS Church’s right to restrict the use of the
2.2 Right to Prevent Uses Other Than Pedestrian Passage: Nothing in the
reservation or use of this easement shall be deemed to create or constitute a
public forum, limited or otherwise, on the Property. Nothing in this easement
is intended to permit any of the following enumerated or similar activities on
the Property: loitering, assembling, partying, demonstrating, picketing, distributing
literature, soliciting, begging, littering, consuming alcoholic beverages or
using tobacco products, sunbathing, carrying firearms (except for police
personnel), erecting signs or displays, using loudspeakers or other devices to
project music, sound or spoken messages, engaging in any illegal, offensive,
indecent, obscene, vulgar, lewd or disorderly speech, dress or conduct, or
otherwise disturbing the peace. Grantee shall have the right to deny access to
the Property to persons who are disorderly or intoxicated or engaging in any of
the activities identified above. The provisions of this section are intended to
apply only to Grantor and other users of the easement and are not intended to
limit or restrict Grantee’s use of the Property as owner thereof, including,
without limitation, the distribution of literature, the erection of signs and
displays by Grantee, and the projection of music and spoken messages by
Grantee.
Id. at 1118–19 (emphasis added).
11. To illustrate this point, Mayor “Rocky” Anderson of Salt Lake City said, “All
of a sudden, the ill feeling that has been under the surface for years has boiled way over
the top with this argument.” T.R. Reid, Salt Lake Street Fight: Mormons and “Gentiles”
Duel over Speech Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2002, at A1. As an example of the
critics of the sale, one activist at a city council meeting exclaimed, “You gave away part
of Main Street!” Id. That person also protested, “And you gave away our constitutional
rights with it! No other city could possibly do that.” Id. H. David Burton, the Church’s
presiding bishop, wrote a letter to the community stating the following:
What was intended as an enhancement of the quiet splendor of the Salt Lake
Temple has now become a platform for hecklers . . . and a haven for others
distributing anti-Church literature, ‘buttonholing’ visitors or simply panhandling.
Such behavior undermines the purpose of the plaza in direct contradiction of
what the parties intended.
Id. A Salt Lake member of the LDS Church put the controversy in these terms: “It has
become a metaphor for the tensions that exist in this city—for the Mormons who feel
unappreciated, and for all the people who feel ignored and discriminated against because
they’re not Mormon.” Id. Whatever side of the debate, no one has been happy about the
situation. The Tenth Circuit decision pleased free speech advocates, while at the same
time angered the members of the LDS Church. See also Heather May, Free Speech,
Religion Collide on SLC Plaza, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 5, 2003, at A1.
12. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1119.
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property. The defendant was the City, and the LDS Church entered the
case as an intervenor. The plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of the
restrictions because they claimed that the property remained a public
forum. Prior to the sale, Main Street had been an historical location for
demonstrations and other expressive activities.13 It is centrally located in
downtown Salt Lake City. Most importantly, the street ran right
between two blocks of the LDS Church’s property—a prime spot to
speak out against the Church.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that the First Amendment had been
violated. They also asserted that the restrictions violated the Establishment
Clause. In addition, they stated a cause of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment, claiming that the restrictions discriminated between the
public and the LDS Church in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that the deed’s
restrictions violated their rights.14
III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULING
A. The Public Forum Claim
On May 14, 2001, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah held
for the City after all parties had moved for summary judgment.15 As to
the First Amendment claim, the district court followed the reasoning in
Hawkins v. City and County of Denver,16 stating that the Hawkins case
was “the controlling legal authority.”17 Accordingly, the district court
13. See May, supra note 11.
14. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1119.
15. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (D.
Utah 2001), rev’d, 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2606 (2003).
The court first had to address sua sponte whether the plaintiffs’ claims were ripe. Id. at
1163. None of the plaintiffs had presented evidence that the restrictions had been
enforced. Their only evidence pointed to their belief that they would be escorted off the
plaza if they attempted any sort of demonstration or public dialogue. Id. at 1164–65.
The court held that “because the bans create a ‘direct and immediate dilemma’ for
Plaintiffs that could place an ‘inhibiting chill’ on their First Amendment right to free
speech,” the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims were ripe. Id. at 1165 (citation omitted).
16. 170 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999). In Hawkins, Denver turned a formerly public
street into a walkway, the Galleria, that allowed pedestrians to access the various
structures that constitute the Denver Performing Arts Complex. The court upheld
Denver’s ban on all leafleting, demonstrations, and similar activities because the court
found the Galleria to be a nonpublic forum and the policy to be viewpoint neutral. Id. at
1283–84, 1288–89.
17. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
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cited Hawkins for the principle that the “government may close a First
Amendment public forum by inter alia, selling the property, changing its
‘physical character’ or ‘principal use.’”18
In this case, the district court emphasized the fact that the LDS Church
purchased the property for its full market value,19 that the LDS Church
built new sidewalks in a different form and in different places than the
old city sidewalks,20 and that the LDS Church created a religious
“enclave,” separate and distinct from nearby areas.21 Additionally, the
court found persuasive the fact that the new plaza no longer constituted a
“part of the City’s automotive, bicycle or transportation grid.”22
Consequently, the court held that because the physical characteristics,
use, and purpose of the property had changed, the plaza no longer
constituted a public forum.23
The court then addressed whether the easement itself constituted a
public forum and concluded that it did not. It held that the intent of the
sale and the changes to the property ended its status as a public forum.24
The court went on to state, “Intent is necessary to establish a designated
public forum.”25 The deed stated that the easement expressly negated the
creation of a public forum.26 However, because the City still had a
property interest in the land, the court held that the City’s easement was
a nonpublic forum and that the restrictions only have to be rationally

18. Id. (quoting Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287–88).
19. Id. Actually, the LDS Church may have paid far more than fair market value
for the land. For the subsurface rights it purchased in 1995, the Church gave the city a
parcel of property worth $2.6 million. For the sale of the surface rights in 1999, the
Church paid $8.1 million. The total price was $10.77 million, placing the land’s value at
$124 per square foot. As a reminder, the land only had sidewalks and a paved street on
its surface. To compare this sale to the value of the nearby Crossroads Mall, the county
tax rolls assessed the value of the mall at $69 per square foot for land that had been
extensively developed into a mall. In addition to all that the Church has paid, it had to
pay more to purchase the easement. Brady Snyder, Price of Plaza Keeps Rising,
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 24, 2002, at A1; see also infra text accompanying notes 173–92.
20. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d. at 1167.
21. Id. at 1167–68. Some of the distinctive features of the new plaza include
distinctive paving, special lighting, landscaping, a large reflective pool, graded
elevations, and security bollards to prevent motor traffic from entering the plaza. Id.
Moreover, the court was impressed by the numbers of pedestrians who use the plaza
daily to access Temple Square to the west and the Church administrative buildings to the
east. The plaintiffs did not challenge the numbers or the assertion that the “vast
majority” of pedestrian use constituted traffic in and out of Church-owned buildings and
property adjacent to the plaza. Id. at 1168–69.
22. Id. at 1169.
23. Id. at 1171.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see also infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
26. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1171; see also supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
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related to a legitimate government purpose in order to be valid.27
The court determined that the restrictions were valid. The City had a
limited interest in the property—to ensure pedestrian access—and this
interest was legitimate. The restrictions on speech and other activities
did not interfere with this interest.28 In addition, the City had a political
interest in pedestrian easements in general without burdening the property
owners with people seeking to express their First Amendment rights.29
Therefore, the restrictions were rationally related to these purposes. To
conclude its First Amendment analysis, the court simply stated, “[T]here
exists no First Amendment right to associate on private property
belonging to another.”30
B. The Establishment Clause Claim
The district court found no violation of the Establishment Clause. The
plaintiffs claimed that the deed delegated to the LDS Church the traditional
government function of interpreting and enforcing the restrictions on the
easement.31 In response, the City and Church argued that the plaintiffs
did not present any evidence of collusion between the City and the LDS
Church and that the sale of the property met the Lemon test.32 By
meeting the test, the sale did not violate the Establishment Clause and
did not delegate any traditional government function to the LDS
Church.33
The court found that the LDS Church had not received any special
authority to determine who could access the easement across the plaza.34
According to the West Church Plaza security policy, the LDS Church
would call the City police if a pedestrian violated the restrictions.35 If
the police did not respond, the deed stated that the LDS Church could
use any lawful means that any other private property owner has to

27. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; see also Randall P. Bezanson
& William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377,
1404–05 (2001).
28. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d. at 1171.
29. Id. at 1173.
30. Id.; see also infra note 144.
31. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
32. Id.; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
34. Id. at 1177.
35. Id.
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enforce the restrictions.36 As a result, the LDS Church had “not been
delegated any exclusive state function or any special status or rights.”37
Next, the court proceeded to analyze the sale of the property under
three prongs of the Lemon test:
Under the Lemon test, a government act does not violate the Establishment
Clause if (1) it has a secular purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not foster an excessive
entanglement of church and state.38

Applying this test, the court found that the sale of the property did not
violate the Establishment Clause.39
Under the first prong, the court found that the City had a secular
purpose for the sale of the property. That purpose was to enhance
Temple Square, one of Utah’s major tourist draws.40 As the sale helped
with this enhancement of the LDS Church’s property, the court
determined that there could be incidental benefits to the LDS Church.
Nevertheless, “incidental benefits to a religion from governmental action
do not invalidate that action” under the Establishment Clause.41
Under the second prong, the court stated that a reasonable observer
would find that the City’s sale of the property to the LDS Church did not
primarily affect an advancement of religion. The City did not advance
the LDS Church because the City sold the property for its full market
value and because the City intended for the sale to promote a secular
purpose—the enhancement of a tourist attraction so that more tourists
could be accommodated.42
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1177–78 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)).
39. Id. at 1179.
40. Id. at 1178. On average, 3.5 to 9 million people visit Temple Square annually.
Id. The square sits immediately to the west of the new plaza.
41. Id. (citing Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 555 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Bauchman involved a student suing her high school, the school district, and the choir
director for forcing her to sing religious songs in the school choir when she did not share
those beliefs. Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 546. The plaintiff’s Establishment Clause claim
arose because she had been ridiculed for objecting to the nature of the songs. The Tenth
Circuit found no violation of the Establishment Clause because of the “obvious secular
purposes” of the songs and because any benefit to religious was “remote, incidental or
indirect.” Id. at 555.
42. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. At least one state’s
constitution requires a stricter standard than the Federal Constitution. In California, the
government is prohibited from “(1) granting a benefit in any form (2) to any sectarian
purpose (3) regardless of the government’s secular purpose (4) unless the benefit is
properly characterized as indirect, remote, or incidental.” Paulson v. City of San Diego,
294 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003).
Consequently, even if the government has a proper secular purpose, the transaction
would be void if the government’s prestige or power is lent to a sectarian purpose. Id. at
1130. Because of these strict requirements, the City of San Diego improperly sold the
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Under the third prong, the court determined that the sale of the
government property for full market value to the LDS Church did not
foster excessive government entanglement in religion.43 In fact, the
court maintained that “[t]o have refused to make an otherwise justified
sale solely because the purchaser was the temporal arm of a religious
organization or because the [p]roperty would be used by its new owner
for religious purposes would have shown perhaps unconstitutional
hostility to religion.”44
C. The Equal Protection Claim
The court expressed its opinion that the plaintiffs had failed to raise
issues of material fact under the Equal Protection Clause—evidence of
discrimination among similarly situated individuals.45 All pedestrians using
the plaza would be treated the same, according to the easement restrictions.
The Church could enjoy the property differently, but its right flowed
from its ownership of the property, not from the easement. Thus, the
LDS Church was not similarly situated with the easement users.46 As a
final point, the court stated that because the easement was a nonpublic
forum, for Equal Protection purposes, the restrictions on the easement
must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.47
part of Mount Soledad city park that contained a cross and veterans memorial in
Paulson. Admitting that the city had a secular purpose of preserving the war memorial
on the site, the Ninth Circuit also scrutinized the transaction for any benefit to a sectarian
purpose. Id. at 1132. The court found that by including in the sale bid invitations the
fact that the cross would be conveyed with the property and that the purchaser must
maintain a war memorial, the city was promoting a Christian message. Id. Moreover, the
purchaser received a financial benefit from the city because it would not have to bear the
cost of removing the cross and replacing it with a secular memorial. Id. at 1133. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held that the City of San Diego had lent its power and prestige to the
preservation of the cross in violation of the California Constitution. Id.
43. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1180.
46. Id. at 1179.
47. Id. (citing ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (D. Nev.
1998), rev’d, 333 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003)); see supra notes 27–30 and accompanying
text. The ACLU case centered on the Fremont Street Experience Mall in Las Vegas,
Nevada. The City of Las Vegas contracted with a private company to demolish five
blocks of Fremont Street to create a mall. ACLU, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1068–69. The
district court in that case held that the mall did not retain its status as a traditional public
forum as the ACLU claimed because the mall had not been created for public expression,
but for economic purposes. Id. at 1074–78. Although the mall was a nonpublic forum,
the court nevertheless held that some of the restrictions were not rationally related to any
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D. The Ruling
As a result of its holdings in this case, the district court granted the
motions for summary judgment for the City and the LDS Church and
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.48 The
plaintiffs appealed.
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S REVERSAL
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit49 analyzed the motions for summary
judgment de novo50 and reversed the district court’s ruling. The court
found that an easement could be a public forum.51 It analogized to the
numerous situations where the government has easements across privately
owned public sidewalks. But the court did not hold that the First
Amendment applies to all easements.52 Here, the court found that there
was a traditional public forum because the City had dedicated the
easement for a pedestrian throughway.53 It also distinguished this case
from other nonpublic forum sidewalk cases because the Main Street
Plaza easement allowed for more than just pedestrian ingress or egress to
LDS Church buildings.54
Next, the court maintained that the LDS Church had not changed the
property sufficiently to change the status of the easement. The LDS
Church removed the entire street from sidewalk to sidewalk, and it built
a pedestrian plaza in the place of the street. Nonetheless, the LDS
Church had replaced the sidewalks in the same locations. Also, the
legitimate government interest. These invalid restrictions included a ban on leafleting
and a licensing scheme for message-bearing merchandise. However, the court upheld
the ban on solicitations. Id. at 1078–85.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the mall remained a public forum. ACLU v.
City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). First, the court determined that
the fact that the mall was open for public access was dispositive that speech activities
would be compatible on the property. Id. at 1101. Second, economic activity had no
bearing on determining the status of the mall as a public forum. Id. at 1102–04. Third,
the court did not find that the characteristics of Fremont Street had changed; it remained
“a commercial district and public thoroughfare.” Id. at 1105. Additionally, the court
agreed that the leafleting ban and the license scheme were invalid. The court then
remanded the case back to the district court to determine if the remaining regulations
were proper time, place, or manner restrictions. Id. at 1106–09.
48. First Unitarian Church, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
49. Judges Seymour, McWilliams, and Henry decided this case. First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 2606 (2003).
50. Id. at 1120.
51. Id. at 1121–24.
52. Id. at 1123 n.5.
53. Id. at 1126.
54. Id. at 1126–28.
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sidewalks remained connected to the City’s pedestrian grid, so the
purpose of the sidewalks had not significantly changed.55 Thus, the
changes were insufficient to alter the status of the sidewalks as a public
forum.56
Finally, the court determined that the speech restrictions were not
valid. It held that the LDS Church’s right to restrict speech activities
amounted to a “First Amendment Free Zone.”57 The complete prohibition
of public speech violated the allowable speech regulations in a traditional
public forum. The only regulations allowed are those necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that are narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.58 The court held that the current restrictions did not meet this test.59
Also, the regulations were not valid time, place, and manner restrictions.
In other words, they were not content-neutral and narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, leaving open an ample
alternative channel of communication.60
The court held that the City must be the party responsible for
regulating speech on the property despite the LDS Church’s claim that
this arrangement would amount to an unconstitutional entanglement of
the City with the LDS Church in the joint administration of the property.61
The court then remanded the case to the district court for findings
consistent with its opinion.62
V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S RULING
A. Easements as Public Fora
The court first analyzed the issue raised by the City and the LDS
Church that the First Amendment cannot apply to an easement restricted
solely for the purpose of pedestrian passage because speech activities are
beyond the scope of the easement.63 The court rejected the City and
55. The reader should recall that the district court found significant the fact that the
plaza no longer was connected to “the City’s automotive, bicycle or transportation grid.”
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
56. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1129–31.
57. Id. at 1132.
58. Id. at 1131–32.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1132.
61. Id. at 1133.
62. Id. at 1133–34.
63. Id. at 1121.
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LDS Church’s contention that the First Amendment does not apply to
nonpossessory property interests (for example, easements)64 or that the
property interest was not significant enough for constitutional analysis.65
The court acknowledged a small body of case law that applies the First
Amendment to all property belonging to the government or to property
owned by a private party but burdened by the government.66
The court’s reasoning on this point was sound. It supported its
conclusion that easements can be public fora with cases that applied First
Amendment principles to mailboxes controlled by the government67 and to
sidewalks that had no government ownership.68 Even more importantly,
the court observed that the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized that First
Amendment analysis does not even require “tangible government
property” or “physical situs.”69
64. Id. at 1122.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see infra notes 67–69.
67. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1122 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)). In U.S. Postal Service, although the
Supreme Court applied the public forum principles to mailboxes, it nevertheless found
that mailboxes were not public fora. The mailboxes did not exist for the communication
of ideas, but for the receipt and delivery of mail. U.S. Postal Serv., 453 U.S. at 128–30.
Justice Brennan disagreed, stating the following:
I believe that the mere deposit of mailable matter without postage is not
“basically incompatible” with the “normal activity” for which a letterbox is
used, i.e., deposit of mailable matter with proper postage or mail delivery by
the Postal Service. On the contrary, the mails and the letterbox are specifically
used for the communication of information and ideas, and thus surely
constitute a public forum appropriate for the exercise of First Amendment
rights . . . .
Id. at 137–38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
68. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1122 (citing Venetian Casino Resort v.
Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 945 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001)). In Venetian Casino
Resort, Las Vegas intended to widen Las Vegas Boulevard (the Strip). In order to do so,
it needed to add another lane of travel where the then-existing public sidewalk was
located. The Venetian Casino entered into an agreement to construct a sidewalk on its
properly, abutting the Strip. Venetian Casino Resort, 257 F.3d at 939–40. After
constructing the private sidewalk, some of the Venetian’s workers demonstrated on the
sidewalk. The police refused to cite anyone. The Venetian brought suit to prevent
further demonstrations on its property. Id. at 940–41. The Ninth Circuit, in a 2–1 decision,
held that even though the sidewalk was private property, it remained a public forum.
The court reasoned that the sidewalk historically had been a public forum, that it was
interconnected with public sidewalks, and that the agreement dedicated the sidewalk for
public use. Therefore, the restrictions on speech on the sidewalk were subject to the
First Amendment. Id. at 941–48.
69. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1122 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1985)). In Cornelius, the Supreme Court
agreed with the respondents that the “forum” constitutes more than just the physical
property, e.g., the workplace. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. It also includes the “access”
that the party wishes to gain from the government, for example, the charity drive. Id. at
788. However, the Court also took into consideration the special needs of the federal
workplace to which the respondents sought access. Id. at 800–02.
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Looking to the public forum “archetype,” the court concluded that the
Main Street easement was subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “Public streets are ‘the archetype
of a traditional public forum.’”70 In fact, the court of appeals noted that
many public highways and streets are owned by private owners, but that
through the means of an easement, they are “held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.”71 Consequently, the court chose to apply the public
forum doctrine to the Main Street Plaza easement. Nevertheless, the
court qualified its holding in footnote five, maintaining:
[T]he mere fact the government has an easement rather than fee title does not
defeat application of the First Amendment. We are not holding the converse,
that the First Amendment applies to all easements. Whether or not a particular
government easement warrants application of forum principles will depend on
the characteristics of the easement, the practical considerations of applying
forum principles, and the particular context the case presents.72

Despite these qualifications, the court did not apply these limiting
factors. Instead, the court determined that because an easement can be a
public forum under the First Amendment, it would then proceed to
analyze the case under forum principles.
Footnote five takes a step in the right direction in that property held by
a private party should be considered differently than property owned by
the government outright. Courts should address the practicality of
70. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1123 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 480 (1988)). One author described why streets and parks are the archetype of a
traditional public forum:
Streets and parks are part of the experience of all citizens. We ordinarily use
streets and parks in a wide variety of roles and statuses, and hence we subject
them to an enormous diversity of competing demands and uses. No one of
these uses has automatic priority. . . . It is this fact, and not a tradition of
public usage for expressive purposes, which underlies the Court’s firm and
correct conclusion that streets should be seen as public forums.
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1793–94 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
71. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1123 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 1123 n.5 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
672–77 (1998)). In Forbes the Court stated, “In the case of television broadcasting,
however, broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general
rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their
journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673. Accordingly, a court
chould find that speech rights are “antithetical” to the rights private property owners
have over their property, even if the government has an easement on that property.
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applying forum analysis to private property and analyze the larger
context of the situation. For example, one court determined that a
church, even when opened up for a public purpose on an election day, is
never a public forum.73 In this case, the Main Street Plaza is a privately
owned public space—a downtown plaza that is obviously owned by a
church.74 In addition, courts should consider the issue that many places
traditionally held out as public forums no longer serve the purpose of
exchanging ideas.75 Ignoring these considerations when private property
is being scrutinized will not sufficiently protect private property owners’
rights. A petitioner should have a higher burden when trying to gain
access to private property under the public forum doctrine.
B. Types of Public Fora
The most important goal behind the public forum doctrine is to protect
vital areas where communication can occur, “especially because of how
indispensable communication in these places is to people who lack
access to more elaborate (and more costly) channels.”76 The most
important aspect of the freedom of expression is to have the ability to
speak, and the public forum presents a place where public discussion and
the political process can be facilitated.77 “[T]he purpose of the public
forum doctrine is to give effect to the broad command of the First
Amendment to protect speech from governmental interference.”78 It is
73. United Food & Commercial Workers v. City of Sidney, 199 F. Supp. 2d 739,
742–44 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
74. See generally JEROLD S. KAYDEN ET AL., PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE:
THE NEW YORK CITY EXPERIENCE (2000) (summarizing the development of zoning
regulations and laws that encouraged private developers to build public spaces—plazas,
arcades, and atriums—in New York City, and including photographs and analyses of the
quality of 320 buildings in New York that maintain public spaces)).
75. See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to
Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1538–39 (1998). The doctrine needs reanalysis by
the Supreme Court because those locations that have served for so long as traditional
public fora no longer are the primary places where the public communicates.
Technology has changed where the public speaks. See infra note 76. Accordingly, the
doctrine is no longer as helpful to the public as it once was in providing venues for
speech activities.
76. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-24, at 987 (2d ed.
1988). In an age where communication can be more effective and more cost-efficient
through the use of the Internet, the principles behind the public forum doctrine should be
reevaluated. See infra note 155. The anomalous holding in the instant case also requires
the reader to reexamine the doctrine because now a private party no longer can control
the expressive conduct on its own property if the government retains an easement for
pedestrian use across the property. When the government is limited in regulating speech
on its own property, the cost to the government is minimal. Bezanson & Buss, supra
note 27, at 1406. The cost cannot be said to be the same for a private party.
77. Post, supra note 70, at 1718.
78. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 697 (1992)
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not so important whether one speaks, or if another will accept or hate the
expression as it is to have the ability to express oneself.79 The doctrine
exists so that the government will always provide a venue for the public
to speak.
Nevertheless, not all government property is classified as public fora.
Moreover, just because a piece of government property is a public forum
does not mean that the public can do or say anything on the forum. The
government can restrict speech activities in a public forum, but the level
of restriction depends on how the forum is classified.80 The courts have
recognized three types of public fora: the traditional public forum, the
designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum.81
The first type of public forum, the traditional public forum, includes
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgments). For an overview of the historical development
of the public forum doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court, see DOM CARISTI, EXPANDING
FREE EXPRESSION IN THE MARKETPLACE: BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC FORUM 30–45,
65–68 (1992); Post, supra note 70, at 1718–64.
79. See Jamin B. Raskin & Clark L. LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored
Rights: Hill v. Colorado, The Vanishing Public Forum and the Need for an Objective
Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 179, 225–26 (2001) (giving several
examples of expression that many people find offensive but are nevertheless protected
under the First Amendment). Another author quite eloquently described why the idea of
a public forum is so valuable to a democratic society:
Although the dynamics of real public forums may never have been as pure
and honorable as the myth, the essential reality grasped by the public forum
concept remains as valid today as it was when thousands of Socialists packed
into Union Square in the early days of this century to hang on every word of
great progressive orators such as Eugene Debs. The larger reality behind the
myth of the debate on the public street-corner is that every culture must have
venues in which citizens can confront each other’s ideas and ways of thinking
about the world. Without such a place, a pluralistic culture inevitably becomes
Balkanized into factions that not only cannot come to agreement about the
Common Good, but also will not even know enough about other subcultures
within the society to engage effectively in the deal-making and horse-trading
that is the key to every modern manifestation of democratic government. If the
public forum is a myth, it is a myth that is indispensable to democracy, and
certainly indispensable to a democracy defined by a constitution such as ours,
in which free speech and expression are essential components of our political
self-definition.
Gey, supra note 75, at 1538–39.
80. The reader should recall that the district court characterized the easement
through the plaza as a nonpublic forum. As such, the City could implement any
restriction on speech that was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See
supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
81. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2606 (2003); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676–79 (1998); Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v.
Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 544–47 (2d Cir. 2002).
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those types of government property that have been “devoted to assembly
and debate.”82 Thus, a traditional public forum is a location where the
government cannot use its proprietary interest to stop expressive
activities, as a normal property owner can.83 The traditional public forum is
created by tradition or by government fiat.84 Upon being deemed a
traditional public forum, the government has only a limited ability to
restrict speech activities on that property.85 Any restriction on speech
will be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. This scrutiny requires the
government to show that the speech restrictions serve a compelling
government interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.86
Additionally, the government may impose content-neutral time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech activities, but the restrictions must be
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication.”87
The second type of public forum is the designated public forum or the
limited public forum. With the designated public forum, the government
has opened a previously closed forum for public discourse.88 A
designated public forum is also subject to strict scrutiny.89 The limited
public forum is one that the government designates specifically to allow
“certain kinds of speakers or . . . the discussion of certain subjects.”90
82. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The court had already pointed out that
streets and parks are the best examples of traditional public fora. See supra notes 70–71
and accompanying text; see, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 757–58, 761 (1995) (finding that the plaza surrounding the state capitol is a
traditional public forum); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1988) (stating that
city and residential streets are traditional fora); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
179–80 (1983) (declaring that the sidewalks surrounding the U.S. Supreme Court are
traditional fora); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (finding
streets and parks to be traditional public fora).
83. Post, supra note 70, at 1730.
84. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1124.
85. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 27, at 1402–03
(stating that as long as the traditional public forum remains “public,” speech rights are
attached to it—the equivalent of a “constitutionally mandated easement[]”).
86. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see, e.g., Hotel Employees & Rest.
Employees Union, 311 F.3d at 545; First Unitarian Church, 308 F. 3d at 1131–32.
87. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
88. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); see also
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. A designated forum is only different from a
traditional forum in the method of its creation. The government must expressly create a
designate public forum.
89. See Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, 311 F.3d at 545 (citing
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
90. Id. (quoting N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 128 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1998)). “Examples of limited public fora include state university meeting facilities
opened for student groups, open school board meetings, city-leased theaters, and subway
platforms opened to charitable solicitations.” Id. (citations omitted).
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Strict scrutiny applies to restrictions that apply to the authorized genre of
speakers or discussion, but restrictions on all other forms of speech need
only be viewpoint neutral and reasonable.91
All other government property constitutes either a nonpublic forum or
something that is not a forum at all.92 On nonpublic forums, the
government may restrict speech so long as the restraints on speech
activities are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.93
The Tenth Circuit did not add to the doctrine of the public forum.
Nonetheless, the court never addressed the possibility that the Main
Street Plaza easement could be a limited public forum94—allowing the
forum to be used for one genre of speakers—the members of the LDS
Church. Instead, the court analyzed the plaintiffs’ argument on appeal
that the easement constituted a traditional public forum, not a nonpublic
forum as the district court held.95
C. Determining the Status of the Forum
The Tenth Circuit proceeded to evaluate the easement according to the
public forum doctrine factors and held that the easement constituted a
traditional public forum. The court studied the record for evidence of
the objective characteristics of the easement, the compatibility of the
easement with speech activities, and the history of the property.96

91. Id. at 545–46. This type of speech content regulation on limited public fora
“comes awfully close to content discrimination.” Bezanson & Buss, supra note 27, at
1404. In fact, someone not belonging to the genre of approved speakers would not likely
win in court if that person sought to gain access to the forum. Post, supra note 70, at 1757.
92. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2606 (2003).
93. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, 311 F.3d at 546. “Examples of
non-public fora include airport terminals, military bases and restricted access military
stores, jailhouse grounds, and the Meadowlands Sports Complex.” Id. (citations omitted).
94. The doctrine of the limited public forum has created problems for the courts to
implement. It “lack[s] a principled basis for distinction between invalid content-based
restrictions and legitimate re-designations of a forum.” Matthew D. McGill, Unleashing
the Limited Public Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 929, 940 (2000). In response to this inherent flaw in the doctrine, most courts have
shied away from its application to the cases presented before them. Consequently, courts
“either conclude[] that the property is a non-public forum or [they] rest[] the holding of
the case on the presence of viewpoint discrimination.” Id.
95. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1124–31.
96. Id.

463

SJOBLOM.DOC

9/18/2019 2:04 PM

1. Objective Characteristics
In spite of the express language in the deed that stated no public forum
was created, the court looked to the objective characteristics of the
easement.97 Specifically, the court stated:
The most important considerations in this analysis are whether the property
shares physical similarities with more traditional public forums, whether the
government has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to the property,
and whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with
the uses to which the government has as a factual matter dedicated the
property.98

First, the court examined the City’s legislative and publicly stated
purpose in creating the easement as the most important objective
characteristic of the easement.99 The court looked at long range City plans
for the area,100 the ordinance passed to allow for the street closure and
sale,101 the right of reverter in the deed,102 the city council meeting
requesting that the City negotiate the right of reverter, and statements
from the City that the sale hinged on the creation of the easement.103 In
other words, the court looked at all other evidence of the City’s intent
except for the express statement of intent in the deed denying the
creation of a public forum.104
While the court claimed that it did not analyze the City’s intent, it in
97. Id. at 1125. The government should not be able to hide behind a statement of
intent when the public’s constitutional rights are implicated. Thus, the government’s
intent is not a factor in public forum analysis. See ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d
1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003).
98. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698–99 (1992)).
99. Id. at 1126–27.
100. According to the court:
The City’s stated purposes for promoting and approving the overall project
were to increase usable public open space in the downtown area, encourage
pedestrian traffic generally, stimulate business activity, and provide a buffer
closed to automobile traffic between the residential area to the north of the
plaza and the business areas to the south.
Id. at 1126.
101. The city council passed the ordinance authorizing the sale on the condition that
“the City retain a perpetual pedestrian easement ‘planned and improved so as to
maintain, encourage, and invite public use.’” Id. (citation omitted).
102. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
103. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1126.
104. Some of this evidence included the fact that the City’s planning commission
had recommended that the easement not be restricted more than what is allowed at a
public park. However, the city council rejected that language in the final ordinance
approving the sale of the land to the LDS Church. Id. at 1118. Nevertheless, the court
stated, the City “cannot simply declare the First Amendment status of property
regardless of its nature and its public use.” Id. at 1124. As discussed below, the Main
Street Plaza’s nature and public use are not so different from cases where the courts have
found property to not be public fora. See infra notes 111–30 and accompanying text.
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fact did so.105 The City’s intent became the most persuasive objective
characteristic of the easement. The court evaluated intent, which is
subjective in nature. Using the City’s subjective intent as the most
important objective characteristic reduces the credibility of the court’s
opinion. The court should have only focused its scrutiny on those
characteristics that were actually objective. Instead, the court determined
that all of this subjective evidence implied that the easement contained a
broad public purpose.106 The court should have looked solely to the
deed, which stated that the easement allowed for pedestrian passage and
access, and analyzed the significance of that fact under the public forum
doctrine.
Next, the court ignored the LDS Church’s objective evidence
regarding the use of the property. For example, most pedestrians, either
Church businessmen or tourists, use the sidewalks through the plaza to
gain access to Church facilities.107 The court stated that it chose to ignore
this evidence because it was “at odds with the publicly and legislatively
stated purposes of the easement.”108 The court’s statement here seems to
indicate that the public purpose of the easement is the most important
factor in the application of the public forum doctrine. Nonetheless, the
court does not make this point clear and should have done so.109
Additionally, it asserted that because these pedestrians entered the plaza
for Church purposes, unrelated to the easement, the LDS Church would
have allowed them to enter the property anyway.110 Thus, in the court’s
view, the evidence was irrelevant to whether the easement constituted a
public forum.
105. Later in the opinion, the court even recognizes that it looked to intent by
stating “the City’s express intent not to create a public forum . . . is at odds with . . . the
City’s express purpose of providing a pedestrian throughway.” First Unitarian Church,
308 F.3d at 1131. The City’s purpose is intent, so the court looked beyond the scope of
its inquiry of analyzing objective characteristics.
106. Id. at 1126.
107. See supra note 21. In fact, a subsequent three-month study of the pedestrian
traffic using the Main Street Plaza proved that most of the pedestrians use the plaza for
access to neighboring LDS Church property. On average, out of the thousands of daily
pedestrians, only approximately 500 people traverse the plaza on a daily basis. Moreover, if
the LDS Church at some point in the future chose to close down the plaza, these
pedestrians would only have to walk an extra two blocks at most to arrive at their
destinations. Heather May, Advisory Board Backs City’s Plaza Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Mar. 5, 2003, at B2.
108. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1127.
109. See infra notes 201–06 and accompanying text.
110. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1127.
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Finally, the court took into consideration the actual physical
characteristics of the plaza.111 The City and the LDS Church did compare
the sidewalks to those in the Hawkins case.112 The Tenth Circuit in the
Hawkins case held that the sidewalks within the Galleria leading to the
Denver Performing Arts Complex (DPAC) did not constitute a public
forum because the “Galleria does not form part of Denver’s automotive,
bicycle or pedestrian transportation grid, for it is closed to vehicles, and
pedestrians do not generally use it as a throughway to another
destination.”113 The court distinguished Hawkins from the instant case
because the sidewalks through the plaza form part of the pedestrian grid,
the public has access to the plaza, and the sidewalks are like other
sidewalks that are public forums.114
a. Main Street Plaza Compared to the Denver
Performing Arts Complex
The Tenth Circuit’s distinction between Hawkins and this case seems
unpersuasive. The Galleria in the Hawkins case was open to the public
and was constructed on what used to be a public street.115 Moreover, the
vast majority of the pedestrians using the Galleria did not use the
throughway to go to another place.116 However, this fact did not mean
that a pedestrian could not use the throughway for such purpose. The
Galleria, a 600-foot throughway, connects to Fourteenth Street at one
end and Speer Boulevard at the other if one passes through a sculpture
park.117 A small distinction between the two cases is that Denver, the
city itself, does not allow demonstrations or leafleting unrelated to the
performances at the DPAC.118
However, the biggest distinction between the two cases is that Salt
Lake City specified in the deed that the Main Street easement allowed
for pedestrian passage, whereas Denver did not have such a document
for the Galleria. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit could not find that the
Galleria connected to the pedestrian grid when hardly anyone used the
throughway except for access to the DPAC. Salt Lake City’s deed
111. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
112. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1127; Hawkins v. City & County of
Denver, 170 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 1999).
113. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287–88.
114. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1127–28.
115. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287. Compare to the sidewalks in the LDS case. See
supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.
116. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287. Compare to the sidewalks in the LDS case. See
supra note 21.
117. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1284.
118. Id. at 1288.
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expressly mentioned that the easement was created for pedestrians, so
the Tenth Circuit may have felt obliged to distinguish this case from
Hawkins on that fact alone. Once the court found that the sidewalks
running through the Main Street Plaza were an “archetype” of a public
forum, it decided that it could not “examine whether special circumstances
would support downgrading the property to a less protected forum.”119
b. Main Street Plaza Compared to the Lincoln Center
However, courts do not always classify all sidewalks and roads as
public fora.120 The Second Circuit handed down an opinion implicating
the public forum doctrine shortly after the Tenth Circuit’s opinion on the
Main Street Plaza case. In Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
Union v. City of New York Department of Parks & Recreation,121 the
Second Circuit concluded that the Lincoln Center Plaza was not a
traditional public forum.122 That plaza is situated in the center of the
Lincoln Center Performing Arts Complex, “bounded by Avery Fisher
119. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1129 n.11 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 481 (1988)). In Frisby, the Supreme Court held that all streets are public fora
no matter who owns the title, including streets running through residential
neighborhoods. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 480–81. However, the Supreme Court held that the
city’s ordinance to prohibit picketing outside an individual’s home was not facially
invalid. The ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest in preserving
the home as a place where one should not be captive to speech that one does not wish to
hear. Thus, the city could enforce an injunction against antiabortion picketers outside an
abortion practitioner’s home. Id. at 484–88. But see Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F.
Supp. 1195, 1202–03 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that the city’s action of vacating public
pedestrian and parking access to the cul-de-sac in front of a Planned Parenthood clinic
was not narrowly tailored).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727–28 (1990) (distinguishing a
sidewalk leading to a post office from one abutting a street); Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287
(holding that the Galleria, a sidewalk connecting the various buildings of the Denver
Performing Arts Center, was not a public forum); Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier &
Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that sidewalks leading
to pier facilities are not traditional public fora because they are not through-routes);
Garrison v. City of Lakeland, 954 F. Supp. 246, 250 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (maintaining that a
private road leading up to a hospital was not a traditional public forum because it was not
dedicated for public use by the city); Rouse v. City of Aurora, 901 F. Supp. 1533, 1537
(D. Colo. 1995) (holding that protestors could not demonstrate on a private sidewalk that
provided access to the shopping center’s stores); Chad v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 861 F.
Supp. 1057, 1061 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (stating that a sidewalk built within the last two years
bordering a public beach is not a traditional or designated public forum).
121. 311 F.3d 534 (2d Cir. 2002). The LDS Church based its appeal to the Supreme
Court on Hotel Employees. Heather May, Plaza Case Appealed to High Court, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Mar. 13, 2003, at D1.
122. Hotel Employees, 311 F.3d at 548.
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Hall on the north, the Metropolitan Opera House on the west, the New
York State Theater on the south, and Columbus Avenue on the east.”123
The Lincoln Center conveyed the plaza to the city after the performing
arts complex was completed. However, Lincoln Center, Inc. manages
the entire property.124 Under its management powers, the company
schedules events on the plaza, but it only approves events “having a
performance, entertainment or artistic component.”125
The Second Circuit held that the plaza was not a public forum because
of its location and primary purpose. The plaza was the centerpiece of
the performing arts complex, easily distinguishable from a typical park
and easily recognizable as being “some special type of enclave.”126 The
fact that some pedestrians used the plaza to access surrounding streets
was only an “incidental feature” of the plaza, not its primary purpose.127
The plaza’s purpose served as an extension of the performing arts
complex—a forecourt for the complex.128 Moreover, the land had not
been dedicated for public use.
In the Main Street Plaza case, the Tenth Circuit, like the Second
Circuit, could have focused on the fact that the plaza was obviously a
religious enclave and that the property served to connect two parcels of
the LDS Church’s property, creating a seamless web.129 In fact, the
plaza runs directly through the middle of the Church’s property—a new
centerpiece for the Church grounds. Instead, the Court decided that the
City’s easement is “better compared to the easement which the Ninth
Circuit held was a public sidewalk, and therefore a traditional public
forum, in Venetian Casino.”130
c. Main Street Plaza Compared to the Venetian Casino
The Ninth Circuit held that the private sidewalk in front of the
Venetian Casino was a traditional public forum.131 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision was based on the fact that the prior sidewalk in front of the
property had been a public forum, that the general public used the
sidewalk because it was connected to and indistinguishable from the
123. Id. at 540.
124. Id. at 540–41.
125. Id. at 541.
126. Id. at 550 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)). But see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
127. Hotel Employees, 311 F.3d at 550.
128. Id. at 551.
129. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
130. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1128 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2606 (2003); see also supra note 68; infra note 156.
131. Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 948 (9th
Cir. 2001).
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public sidewalks to the north and south, and that the sidewalk was
dedicated for public use.132
The Main Street case is most factually similar to Hawkins and Hotel
Employees, where the courts did not find a public forum. Nevertheless,
the most distinguishing fact from these cases is the dedication of the
easement for public access and passage, which makes the Main Street
case more like the Venetian Casino case.133 Yet, no court has explicitly
stated that a public dedication always creates a public forum. Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit had to look at other factors, such as the compatibility
of speech on the easement and the history of the property. However,
these traditional public forum factors make the Main Street case seem
more similar to Hawkins and Hotel Employees.
2. Compatibility of Speech Activities
The second factor the Tenth Circuit addressed was “whether speech
activities are compatible with the purpose of the easement.”134 Having
found that the plaza sidewalks share many characteristics with other
traditional public fora, the court concluded that prohibiting all speech
activities on the easement was “implausible” and that speech activities
should not interfere with pedestrian traffic because people are “capable
of circumnavigating the occasional protestor.”135 Therefore, the court held
that speech activities are compatible with the easement.136 Admitting that
circumstances may arise wherein expressive activities could be disruptive to
pedestrian passage, the court assumed that reasonable time, place, and
132. Id. at 947.
133. The dedication of the private Venetian Casino sidewalk to public use was
intensely criticized by the dissent in that opinion. “The majority . . . cobbl[ed] together a
dedication from various provisions in the contract, while ignoring the great weight of the
contractual language demanding the opposite conclusion.” Id. at 956–57 (Brunetti, J.,
dissenting). The same criticism could be said of the Tenth Circuit in that they ignored
the express language of the deed that clearly stated that the easement did not create a
public forum. See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1124.
134. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1128.
135. Id. (quoting Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). In
Lederman, Robert Lederman was arrested for distributing literature at the East Front
sidewalk on the U.S. Capitol Grounds. Lederman, 291 F.3d at 39–40. Lederman
challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance under which he was arrested. The court held
that the sidewalks, while not bordering a public street, were a public forum. Id. at 44.
The court further held that the ban on expressive activities on the Capitol sidewalks was
unconstitutional because the ordinance was not narrowly tailored, seriously prohibiting
speech without providing a significant benefit to the government. Id. at 46.
136. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1129.

469

SJOBLOM.DOC

9/18/2019 2:04 PM

manner restrictions are available to prevent potential disruptions.137
The court did not analyze whether speech activities were compatible
with the LDS Church’s property rights.138 At this point in the opinion,
the court should have discussed “the practical considerations of applying
forum principles, and the particular context the case present[ed].”139
Instead, the court maintained, “[T]he effects of expressive activit[ies]
such as congestion, noise, and disruption . . . are the necessary cost of
securing our First Amendment freedoms and these effects must be
tolerated to a reasonable extent.”140 Most government property, however,
does not constitute a public forum.141 In fact, the free admittance to
government property does not automatically create a public forum.142
Indeed, the First Amendment only creates a duty for the government not
to restrict speech.143 The private property owner has no such duty.144
137. Id. at 1128–29.
138. Id. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), Justice Brennan feared that the
rigid characterization of a place as a public forum or nonpublic forum would lead to
unjust results. He desired a more flexible approach to the cases involving the protection
of speech. He did not want the Court to focus on the presence of a public forum. Greer,
424 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He stated:
Realizing that the permissibility of a certain form of public expression at a
given locale may differ depending on whether it is asked if the locale is a
public forum or if the form of expression is compatible with the activities
occurring at the locale, it becomes apparent that there is a need for a flexible
approach. Otherwise, with the rigid characterizations of a given locale as not a
public forum, there is the danger that certain forms of public speech at the
locale may be suppressed, even though they are basically compatible with the
activities otherwise occurring at the locale.
Id. at 860; see also Post, supra note 70, at 1744.
139. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1123 n.5; see supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
140. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1129 (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 701 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
The newlywed couple, which had just left the LDS temple on December 17, 2002,
probably would not agree. Rather than being greeted by family members and friends
after their wedding ceremony and enjoying their company, they had to suffer through a
preacher shouting into a megaphone as the couple had their wedding pictures taken. No
one stopped the preacher. Heather May, Plaza Noise Not Protected Speech, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Jan. 9, 2003, at D3. That same week, a group of men shouted anti-Mormon
catcalls through bullhorns at another wedding party. Reid, supra note 11.
141. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. One scholar, Jerold Kayden,
argues that because public expression is occurring more often at privately owned areas,
like shopping malls, private subdivisions, and stadiums, the government should put these
private property owners on notice that this type of property should be open to the public.
Molly McDonough, Defining a Public Space: Courts Interpret the Meaning of ‘Traditional
Public Forum,’ A.B.A. J., Mar. 2003, at 24. Jerold Kayden studied many open, private
areas in New York City that the public enjoys, and he argues that people using those
areas should have greater rights. See KAYDEN ET AL., supra note 74, at 55–59.
142. Greer, 424 U.S. at 836; see also Post, supra note 70, at 1740–41.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
144. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1976); see also First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165–66 (D. Utah 2001), rev’d,
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Therefore, the goals of the public forum doctrine should be balanced
against the private party’s ownership rights to prevent private property
from being unduly burdened by the First Amendment.
3. History
The third and final factor that the court analyzed was the history of the
property. The court recognized that the government has the authority to
close a public forum by “selling the property, changing its physical
character, or changing its principal use.”145 However, the court here
never considered whether the sale and the retention of the easement were
sufficient to change the status of the forum. Consequently, the court
scrutinized the history of Main Street before the sale, rejecting the
argument that it should only consider the history of the easement since its
creation at the moment of the sale of the property.146 Upon evaluating
Main Street’s history, the court held that the use and character of the
property had not changed sufficiently to convert the status of the forum.147
The court looked solely to the history of Main Street, which demonstrated
that Main Street had been a public forum. The court acknowledged that
the “mere fact that a space is on what used to be a public street does not
automatically render it a public forum.”148 On the other hand, the court
found that the primary purpose had not changed—providing a pedestrian
308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2606 (2003); S. Robert Carter,
III, The Sound of Silence: Why and How the FCC Should Permit Private Property
Owners to Jam Cell Phones, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 343, 368 (2002)
(reaffirming that the law does not require the private property owner to hold out their
property for public discussion despite the fact that the many important gathering places
are located on private property). But see McDonough, supra note 141, at 24 (discussing
Jerold Kayden’s arguments that private property owners should have this duty where
their property is used as a place for expressing ideas).
The Supreme Court has concluded that where a private party provides facilities similar
to those provided by municipalities, such as sidewalks, streets, and public parking, the
First Amendment does not automatically apply to that private property. Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568–69 (1972). The Lloyd Court did not give the petitioner First
Amendment rights at a private shopping center. Id. at 570. But see Pruneyard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (allowing a state constitution to create greater
First Amendment protections so that speech rights could be granted at a private shopping
center as long as those greater rights did not amount to a taking).
145. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 699–700)
(emphasis added).
146. Id. at 1129–30.
147. Id. at 1130–31.
148. Id. at 1130 (citing Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287
(10th Cir. 1999)).
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passage as part of the City’s transportation grid. The pedestrians using the
easement would be the same pedestrians who used the sidewalks
abutting Main Street prior to the sale.149 As Main Street previously had
been open to public speech, the court determined that “the most
important functions” of the property had not changed and that these
functions were tied to speech activities.150 Therefore, the history of the
property aided the court’s conclusion that the easement was a traditional
public forum, unchanged by the sale of the property.151
Subsequently, the court compared the changes in this case to those in
Hawkins. This comparison shows how slight the factual distinctions
among the public forum doctrine cases are. The court stated the following:
In Hawkins, the court found that the walkways had changed sufficiently not
only because they served a different purpose—ingress and egress to the DPAC
facilities—but also because their physical nature was different, that is, they
dead-ended at DPAC rather than remaining part of the city’s pedestrian grid.
Here, while certain physical characteristics of the walkways have changed, they
are still intended to provide passage through, not to, Church property.152

Despite what the court stated, the factual distinctions between the two
cases were minimal. In both, pedestrians could use the properties to pass
from one street to another.153 Both throughways were constructed over
prior public streets. Also, most people using the properties use them for
ingress and egress.154 In other words, the Hawkins case is hardly
distinguishable from this case, except for the express public use dedication
in the easement.
The court also ignored the fact that most of the property as a whole
had been altered significantly. The sidewalk’s purpose had not changed,
but the property itself had. Motorists no longer can use it for passage,
but pedestrians use the plaza daily to access the LDS Church’s property.
Another unanswered question in the Main Street case is whether the
historical analysis of the property is relevant to whether the locale is
actually used for speech purposes.155 The way people communicate has
149. Id. at 1130–31.
150. Id. at 1131.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1130 (citation omitted).
153. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 21.
155. The historical analysis can often draw arbitrary results, especially when different
fora have different ages. Consequently, they have different traditions, making the
comparison of one forum to another an exercise in line-drawing, for which places receive
special constitutional speech protection. Post, supra note 70, at 1758–60. Moreover,
how speech occurs has significantly changed over time:
Linking the public forum doctrine to quaint notions of Sunday strolls by
Speakers’ Corner will do nothing to open avenues of communication in the
world where most modern communication takes place—inside public buildings
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changed, but the court never addressed this issue. Instead, it continued
to rely on the historical comparison of the new Main Street Plaza to the
old Main Street.156
The historical analysis was inconsistent and unhelpful for this situation.
The petitioner’s burden should be high for a court to find that a piece of
private property constitutes a public forum. This burden should not be
met by a weak historical analysis, for the law still recognizes that selling
the property can change the status of the forum.157
D. Regulating Speech on the City’s Easement
On a traditional public forum, the government has the power to regulate
speech activities only to the extent that the
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The [government] may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are contentneutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.158

Applying this standard to the speech regulations159 on the Main Street
and halls, alongside public buildings dedicated to activities other than
community gatherings, over government-developed networks such as the
broadcast media and the Internet, and through programs funded by the
government that facilitate the dissemination of ideas throughout the country.
Gey, supra note 75, at 1575. Gey also supports abandoning the historical comparison of
a new, potential forum to a street. Instead, he argues, “[T]he public forum doctrine . . .
[should] apply to any instrumentality ‘specifically used for the communication of
information and ideas.’” Id. at 1576 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 137 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)).
156. In Venetian Casino, the Ninth Circuit also did not analyze the history of the
actual property interest. The property where the Venetian built the sidewalk had always
been private property. The court scrutinized the history of the prior existing sidewalk
along Las Vegas Boulevard, which had been demolished to make room for the added
lane of road traffic. Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937,
953 (9th Cir. 2001) (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
157. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699–700
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1131–32 (10th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2606 (2003) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); see supra notes 82–87 and
accompanying text. But see, e.g., Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281,
1288–92 (10th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the “reasonableness” of the speech restrictions on a
nonpublic forum).
159. See supra note 10. The Church’s speech rights arise from its property rights as
the owner of the property. They do not arise from the easement. Therefore, all speech is
banned by the easement.
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Plaza easement, the court found that the restrictions were invalid.160
In this instance, the Tenth Circuit compared the plaza speech
restrictions to those in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc.161 In that case, the government passed a statute that practically
banned all First Amendment expression at the Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX). The Supreme Court maintained that “such a ban cannot
be justified even if LAX were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable
governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of
speech.”162 In this case, the Tenth Circuit claimed that the City’s
restrictions also created a “First Amendment Free Zone”163 because no
one could express an opinion except for the LDS Church. The court
concluded that if the City truly wants an easement through the Main
Street Plaza, it must allow speech because the easement is a public
forum. “Otherwise, [the City] must relinquish the easement so the
parcel becomes entirely private.”164
Subsequently, the court acknowledged that the City does not have to
allow speech on the easement that may affect public safety, upset the
competing uses of the easement, or cause distressing levels of noise at
inappropriate times.165 Recognizing that the LDS Church has “the primary
anchor of interest in the property,” the court emphasized that the City
has the right to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
that can take into account the Church’s property and religious interests.166
On a final note, the court determined that only the City could regulate
speech on the plaza, not the LDS Church.167 The Church claimed that such
160. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1132. “Once a new forum is labeled
either public or non-public, the battle over whether private speech can occur in that
forum is usually decided.” Gey, supra note 75, at 1548. The City and the LDS Church
could not hope for the Tenth Circuit to uphold the restrictions if it held that the easement
was a public forum.
161. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
162. Id. at 575.
163. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1132.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1133. Salt Lake City already has codes against disturbing the peace.
Some of the codes include prohibiting the issuance of a permit for a sound device within
500 feet of a church and prohibiting the disruption of a gathering. Unfortunately, since
the Tenth Circuit handed down this opinion, and before the eventual sale of the
easement, the police did enforce the codes on the plaza. The Mayor feared a lawsuit,
especially because protestors on the plaza threatened legal action. Offended pedestrians
expressed a desire not to call the police on obnoxious people because they did not want
to feed the contention. See May, supra note 140. Arguably, the restrictions in the
easement did prohibit expressive conduct similar to that which valid time, place, and
manner restrictions prohibit because of the nature of the property. See supra note 10.
Thus, the court went too far in concluding the easement was a First Amendment free
zone. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text.
167. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1133. But see Hotel Employees & Rest.
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a holding would violate the Establishment Clause. Without analyzing
the Church’s claim under the Lemon test,168 the court merely responded
that it was “not persuaded.”169
Perhaps the reasoning behind the court’s cursory holding on this issue
encompasses the doctrine of state action. In Hotel Employees, handed
down just weeks after the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the Second Circuit
upheld a licensing agreement with Lincoln Center, Inc., a private party,
to allow Lincoln Center to regulate speech on New York City’s property.170
The court did not find a constitutional violation with the enforcement of
the regulations. Consequently, it did not determine whether Lincoln Center
was a state actor acting on behalf of New York City and thus liable as
the government would have been if there had been a violation.171 While
Employees Union v. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 554 (2d Cir. 2002)
(allowing Lincoln Center Inc., to continue to determine which permits to issue for use of
the Lincoln Center Plaza, which is city property).
168. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme Court also
recognizes two other establishment tests. Besides the Lemon test, the Court has used the
endorsement test and the coercion test. The endorsement test questions whether “the
challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval,
of their individual religious choices.” County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597
(1989) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)). The
Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), established the coercion test. It
states:
[T]he principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause; and (2) it is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.
Ross Schmierer, Comment, An Attempt to Pick up the Fallen Bricks of the Wall
Separating Church and State After Santa Fe v. Doe, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1301 (2002).
169. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1133. The court did not address the issue
of whether the sale of the property to a religion violates the Establishment Clause,
indicating agreement with the district court that the sale did not constitute a violation.
See supra notes 31–44 and accompanying text. The sale of the property to a religion
may nonetheless constitute government speech in some abstract sense. If so, the
government cannot favor or disfavor religion by such an action. See Bezanson & Buss,
supra note 27, at 1406–09. Nevertheless, the courts do not overrule government actions
that incidentally benefit a religion. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The
Church paid full price for the property and did not obtain any favoritism from the City.
See supra note 19.
170. See generally Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, 311 F.3d at 539,
541. Lincoln Center, Inc. limited expressive activities on the Lincoln Center to those
“having a performance, entertainment or artistic component.” Id. at 541.
171. Id. at 543–44. However, private parties may never rise to the status of a state
actor. See Carter, supra note 144, at 367.
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providing little guidance on the subject of state action, Hotel Employees
is an important example of where a court allows a private party to
regulate speech on government property.
If the Tenth Circuit had allowed the LDS Church to regulate speech
on the easement, then it would have had to address whether the Church
was a state actor. If the court had found that the Church was a state
actor, the situation would have implicated the Entanglement Clause.172
The court never reached this issue, and it ruled that the City must
regulate speech activities on the easement.
VI. ENDGAME
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling.173
Rather than ending the controversy, the ruling only stirred the local
debate.174 The LDS Church was upset that it paid for land that it thought it
could control as the private property owner.175 The Church thought that
the ruling invalidated the easement, requiring the City to give it up, while
the City contended that only the restrictions on the easement were invalid.176
In order to end the controversy, Mayor Rocky Anderson proposed to
sell the easement to the LDS Church in exchange for land the LDS
172. In determining whether a private party is a state actor, courts look at several factors:
1) [W]hether there was a sufficient nexus between the state and the private
actor which compelled the private actor to act as it did; 2) whether the private
actor has assumed a traditionally public function; and 3) whether there is a
sufficient “symbiotic relationship” between the state and the private actor so
that the state may be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.
Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc.,
745 F. Supp. 65, 69 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05
(1982); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841–42 (1982)). In Faneuil Hall
Marketplace, the district court held that the marketplace, owned in fee simple by the city
and leased to a private party, retained its status as a traditional public forum under both
the public function and symbiotic relationship tests. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, 745 F.
Supp. at 70–75. The district court in the Main Street case distinguished Faneuil Hall from
the instant facts in that the lessor exercised police power over those who used the
easement, and the marketplace had no distinguishable boundaries with the adjacent
public areas. First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1170
(D. Utah 2001), rev’d, 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2606
(2003). Seemingly, both Hotel Employees and Faneuil Hall imply that the LDS Church
would have had to do more than just ask the police to remove those people who would
have violated the easement restrictions. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
173. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1133–34. J. Ted Stewart reversed his
ruling in January 2003. Heather May, Judge Reverses Himself on Plaza, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Jan. 31, 2003, at C3.
174. See supra note 11.
175. Snyder, supra note 19.
176. First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1126 n.8. The court did not resolve this
contention between the City and the Church as to the effect of the case. The Church was
reluctant to return to court to decide this issue. Heather May, City Not Obligated on
Plaza, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 23, 2002, at D1.
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Church owned on the west side of town in Glendale177—land necessary
for the City to obtain a $5 million commitment of funds for a community
center on the site.178 The proposed deal also required the City and the
Church to each pay one half of the American Civil Liberties Union’s
(ACLU) attorney fees for the lawsuit.179
In lieu of the easement-land exchange, the ACLU threatened to file
another action against the City. It claimed that it would have two grounds
for a lawsuit. First, the ACLU would claim that the City violated the
Establishment Clause by endorsing the Latter-day Saints faith.180 Second, it
would claim that even if the City could sell the easement to the LDS
Church, the property would remain a public forum because the property
retains the public function of a sidewalk.181 In fact, one attorney for the
ACLU stated that in order for the City to avoid another lawsuit, the LDS
Church “would have to put up a brick-and-mortar fence and turn [the
plaza] into a private courtyard or construct buildings on the plaza.”182
Initially, the Avenues and Glendale neighborhoods, the City’s
transportation board, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Downtown
Alliance all supported the land swap.183 However, at least two city council
members stated that they would not support the community center
solution.184 Members of the Glendale neighborhood, while supportive of
the community center overall, were concerned about the increase in
taxes that would be necessary to run the center.185
177. Originally, the mayor just wanted to enforce the time, place, and manner
restrictions on the plaza. His office developed a plan that would allow free speech on ten
percent of the plaza, permitting the Church to restrict speech on the remainder. When
the LDS Church expressed disapproval of the Mayor’s plan, the Mayor developed the
land swap proposal. Brady Snyder, Rocky to Take Lead on Plaza, DESERET NEWS, Mar.
20, 2003, at B1.
178. The Alliance for Unity plans to develop the site. The community center would
house offices for the University of Utah and Intermountain Health Care, which would provide
free legal, business, and medical advice, and educational opportunities for adults and children.
Brady Snyder, Council Questions Plaza Proposal, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 6, 2003, at B1.
179. May, supra note 6. While asking for more in attorney fees, the ACLU agreed
to a sum of $200,000. Heather May, SLC to Pony up $200,000 to ACLU Lawyers, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Apr. 25, 2003, at A1.
180. May, supra note 6.
181. Snyder, supra note 178.
182. May, supra note 6.
183. Heather May, Glendale Backs Deal to End Plaza Fight, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar.
22, 2003, at B2.
184. Brady Snyder, 2 on Council Seek Plaza Restrictions, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 20,
2003, at A1.
185. May, supra note 183.

477

SJOBLOM.DOC

9/18/2019 2:04 PM

As a result, the land swap was not certain to occur. Therefore, the
LDS Church filed an appeal to the Supreme Court on March 12, 2003,
while still preferring the land swap as the ultimate solution to the
controversy.186
In May 2003, the City had the easement across Main Street Plaza
appraised at $500,000, or five percent of the plaza’s overall value.187 J.
Philip Cook & Associates performed the appraisal, and they also appraised
the LDS Church’s land in Glendale at $275,000 and the current overall
value of the Main Street Plaza at $9.3 million.188 For the easement, the
LDS Church would give the Glendale land to the City and pay $104,586
for the ACLU’s attorney fees and $250,000 for the building of a
community center on the Glendale land, for a total of nearly $630,000.189
On June 10, 2003, the Salt Lake City Council voted 6–0 with one
abstention for the plan to exchange the easement for the LDS Church’s
land in Glendale and money.190 The exchange became official on July 28,
2003.191 Both Mayor Anderson and the LDS Church’s Presiding Bishop
H. David Burton hoped the exchange would end the controversy.192
Then, on August 7, 2003, the ACLU filed suit against Mayor Anderson
and Salt Lake City for giving in to pressure from and unduly favoring
the LDS Church, thus violating the Establishment Clause.193 The ACLU
also alleged that the City could not remove free speech from a traditional
public forum even by a sale of the land to a private party, basing this
claim mostly on the recent Ninth Circuit ruling194 in ACLU v. City of Las
Vegas.195 Thus the controversy continues.

186. May, supra note 121.
187. Heather May, Plaza Easement Appraisal Ready, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 15,
2003, at A1. The ACLU criticized the appraisal as a “paltry” sum because First Amendment
rights are “priceless.” Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Heather May, S.L. Council OKs LDS Plaza Swap, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 11,
2003, at A1.
191. May, supra note 5.
192. Id.
193. Brady Snyder, ACLU Rekindles the Main Plaza Ire, DESERET MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 8, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Snyder, ACLU Rekindles]. The plaintiffs in this new
suit include the Utah Gospel Mission, the First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City,
Shundahal Network, the Utah National Organization for Women, Craig Axford, and Lee
Siegel. Brady Snyder, ACLU Plaza Suit Includes Several Plaintiffs, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 8, 2003, at A5.
194. Snyder, ACLU Rekindles, supra note 193; see supra note 47.
195. 333 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in First Unitarian Church is a controversial
ending to a complex situation. The factual distinctions among cases
implicating the public forum doctrine do not fully justify the holdings.196
To further illustrate that the factual distinctions are not sufficient, the
district court compared the facts in this case to many of the same cases,
and the district court ruled differently than the Tenth Circuit.197 Relying
on this line of cases, especially when applying the public forum doctrine
to private property, will continue to be problematic for future litigants
until the doctrine is made clearer.
The court should have taken into consideration the LDS Church’s
property stake much earlier in the case. The court’s decision to analyze
the easement separate and apart from the LDS Church’s proprietary
interest is unsettling. First, private property owners have no duty to hold
out their property as public fora for expressive purposes.198 Second,
most government property is not open for expressive purposes. “The
government would simply be unable to perform its proper functions if it
had to work with and around a wide range of speech uses competing for
government space.”199 Similarly, not every property burdened by a
government easement should be a public forum. The private party’s
proprietary interest must be respected when determining the public
forum status of a government easement on private property.200
The Venetian court stated that “by dedicating the property to public
use, the owner has given over to the State . . . ‘one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property,’ the right to exclude others.”201 If this statement is conclusive
in and of itself for public forum analysis, then the City’s easement
through Main Street Plaza has to be a traditional public forum. Consequently,
196. “[F]our different federal courts, confronted with three substantially similar
programs, approached the public forum doctrine in five different ways . . . [and] reached
three different decisions regarding the type of forum at issue.” Suzanne Stone Montgomery,
Note, When the Klan Adopts-A-Highway: The Weakness of the Public Forum Doctrine
Exposed, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 557, 558 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
197. See supra notes 15–30 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 144.
199. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 27, at 1473.
200. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
201. Venetian Casino Resort v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 946 (9th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Dolan v. City Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994)).

479

SJOBLOM.DOC

9/18/2019 2:04 PM

the rest of the court’s analysis on history and compatibility was moot
and, in fact, hardly relevant. Under this reasoning, a private owner who
has property burdened by an easement dedicated to public use has to
hold out the property as a traditional public forum.
The question for the courts should be whether the private property is
public in nature, not whether it is like public property, because “property
[does not] lose its private character merely because the public is
generally invited to use it.”202 Thus, limiting a court’s analysis of the public
forum doctrine to whether private property has been dedicated to public
use does not adequately address all of the concerns raised by this
Casenote. The analysis should not be so simple when both property and
First Amendment rights are in conflict. These concerns include whether
an easement can have a limited public use, and whether the separate
quality of the private property can put the public on notice that they are
not accessing a public forum.203
Determining whether private property should be subject to constitutional
standards, such as the public forum doctrine, is “necessarily fact-bound.”204
Therefore, courts should look beyond the document dedicating the private
property to public use. They must also determine whether the property’s
characteristics put the public on notice that a private party owns the
property.
Under this modified public forum doctrine, courts will only use the
first and second factors, objective characteristics and compatibility of
speech, in analyzing private property burdened by a government easement
or regulation.205 Their analysis will be limited to scrutinizing the objective
characteristics of the property in deciding whether the public has notice
of the private nature of the property. For example, if the government
sold a traditional public forum, the private party should make the
necessary changes to the property in order to put the public on notice.
These changes might include putting up signs or changing the nature of the
property, as the LDS Church did to Main Street. In addition, courts will
evaluate the compatibility of the government property interest to
determine if it has been dedicated for public use.206 In this case, there
was a public dedication for pedestrian access and passage.
202. Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 569.
203. See Venetian Casino Resort, 257 F.3d at 945 (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992)).
204. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982); see also Citizens to
End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, 745 F. Supp. 65,
69 (D. Mass. 1990).
205. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
206. Thus, a utility easement or an easement solely reserved for government access
would not cause the private property to be dedicated for a public use. The public must
be guaranteed some sort of use in order for the doctrine to even be implicated.
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The courts should not look to the history of the property so that private
property owners are not unduly burdened by constitutional constraints
and so that they are not discouraged from purchasing property from the
government in the future.207 In summary, under the modified approach,
courts will decide whether the private property has been dedicated for
public use. If so, they will hold that the property is a public forum
unless the property owner puts the public on notice that the property is
now private. Under this approach, the court would have concluded that
the Main Street Plaza was not a public forum because the public had
been put on notice.208
This method allows the government and private property owners to
determine how the sale of the property will affect the property’s public
forum status. This method will permit privately held public sidewalks
and parks to remain public fora because the public cannot tell that the
property is private while also letting the government retain easements for
limited public uses, such as pedestrian access and passage. If the
government can allow pedestrian access and passage on its property
without also creating a public forum, then government easements should
not be treated differently.209
This method addresses all of the concerns expressed in this Casenote
and even addresses U.S. Supreme Court Justice Black’s concern regarding
the rights of the private property owner:
I have never believed that [the First Amendment] gives any person or group of
persons the constitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they please,
without regard to the rights of private or public property or to state law. . . .
[The First Amendment] does not guarantee to any person the right to use
someone else’s property, even that owned by government and dedicated to other
purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas.210

207. Since 1998, the LDS Church has been trying to acquire Martin’s Cove, an area
in Wyoming where the Martin Handcart Company, a group of LDS pioneers from
Britain, became waylaid in the snow in 1856. Resistance has met the attempt to
purchase the land. In January 2003, Senator Craig Thomas of Wyoming announced that
the Bureau of Land Management would offer a twenty-year lease to the Church to
manage the property. The Church has not yet accepted this compromise. It has
expressed reluctance to accept anything other than full property rights because of the
Main Street Plaza situation. Christopher Smith, Senator’s Announcement of Lease Offer
on Martin’s Cove Is News to Parties, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 18, 2003, at A1.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 19–23 (outlining the changes that would
put the public on notice that the property had switched owners and now belonged to the
LDS Church).
209. See, e.g., supra note 120.
210. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 166 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
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While this solution will help create a better balance between free
speech rights and private property rights, the entire doctrine needs
reevaluation. The places where the public speaks have changed. The
public forum doctrine guarantees a venue to speak, but the venues are
changing. The U.S. Supreme Court should take the next public forum
doctrine case on appeal, apply this modified approach, evaluate the
principles behind the doctrine, and determine how the factors could be
reworked to better meet the goals of the public forum doctrine.
RANDALL R. SJOBLOM
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